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CONSTRUCTIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE FACETS OF WEIL
DESCENT ON ELLIPTIC CURVES
P. GAUDRY, F. HESS, AND N.P. SMART
Abstract. In this paper we look in detail at the curves which arise in the
method of Galbraith and Smart for producing curves in the Weil restriction of
an elliptic curve over a nite eld of characteristic two of composite degree. We
explain how this method can be used to construct hyperelliptic cryptosystems
which could be as secure as cryptosystems based on the original elliptic curve.
On the other hand, we show that the same technique may provide a way of
attacking the original elliptic curve cryptosystem using recent advances in the
study of the discrete logarithm problem on hyperelliptic curves.
We examine the resulting higher genus curves in some detail and propose an
additional check on elliptic curve systems dened over elds of characteristic
two so as to make them immune from the methods in this paper.
1. Introduction
In this paper we address two problems: how to construct hyperelliptic cryptosys-
tems and how to attack elliptic curve cryptosystems dened over elds of composite
degree over F
2
.
As explained in [17], there is currently no practical method which generates cryp-
tographically secure Jacobians of hyperelliptic curves that have no special added
structure. We shall present a method that will produce a hyperelliptic Jacobian re-
lated to a `random' elliptic curve, which is secure assuming one believes the discrete
logarithm problem on the elliptic curve is itself hard.
For the second problem we turn our construction of hyperelliptic cryptosystems
on its head and argue that this provides evidence for the weakness of the original
elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. We stress that this does not provide
evidence for the weakness of elliptic curve systems in general, but only those which
are dened over the special nite elds considered in this paper. These elds are
extensions of composite degree over the eld F
2
.
Let
E : Y
2
+XY = X
3
+ X
2
+ 
denote an elliptic curve dened over a eld of characteristic two, which is not dened
over a proper subeld of K = F
q
n
. We let m denote an integer, which is dened in
Lemma 6, that satises 1  m  n. We assume that our elliptic curve satises one
of the following conditions;
y
8
<
:
either n is odd;
or m = n;
or Tr
K=F
2
() = 0:
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We shall see that if n is even, then only approximately 1=(2q) of all elliptic curves
over K are eliminated by the above condition. We shall prove the following
Theorem 1. Let E(F
q
n
) denote an elliptic curve satsifying condition (y). Let
#E(F
q
n
) = ph, where p is a large prime. Assuming the map  dened below
does not have kernel divisible by p, one can solve the discrete logarithm problem
in the p-cyclic subgroup of E(F
q
n
) in time O(q
2+
) where the complexity estimate
holds for a xed value of n  4 as q !1.
The complexity in the Theorem should be compared to the time estimate of
O(q
n=2
) for the best general purpose algorithm, namely Pollard's rho method. We
conjecture that the condition on the kernel of the map  hold in all cryptographically
interesting cases.
The implied constant in the O() notation of the Theorem contains a very bad
dependence on n, of the order of O(2
n
!). Hence, for certain values of n the crossover
point between the method of the Theorem and Pollard's rho method may be at
higher values of q than are used in practical elliptic curve cryptosystems. However,
we shall exhibit experimental evidence that for n = 4 and around 1=q of the elliptic
curves dened over F
q
4
, the method of the above Theorem is better than Pollard
rho for values of q used in practice. For other elliptic curves over F
q
4
our method
is only asymptotically better than Pollard rho, and further practical experiments
need to be carried out to deduce whether the crossover point is at a size of q which
is of cryptographic interest.
Our methods are based on the idea of Weil descent on elliptic curves. Hence,
much of the following is an extension of the work begun by Frey in [7] and continued
in [9], to which we refer the reader for further details. The details of elliptic curve
cryptosystems which we shall require can be found in [3].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give some simple examples of
curves dened over a special type of eld extension, for which hand calculation is
particularly simple. In Section 3 we give proofs that the properties observed in the
hand calculations hold in general. In addition, we shall construct an explicit group
homomorphism
 : E(F
q
n
)! Cl
0
(H);
where Cl
0
(H) is the degree zero divisor class group of a hyperelliptic function eld
over F
q
. As we stated earlier, if the map  maps the cryptographically interesting
subgroup of E(F
q
n
) to the zero element in Cl
0
(H) then our method will fail to work.
However, since it is highly unlikely that the kernel of  will contain almost the whole
of the group E(F
q
n
), we expect that our method will work in all cryptographically
interesting examples.
In Section 4 we show how our method of producing curves in the Weil restriction
can be used to construct hyperelliptic cryptosystems, whilst in Section 5 we explain
how one could possibly attack the underlying elliptic curve system using the Weil
restriction. In Section 6 we report on an experiment using the index calculus
algorithm of Gaudry on one of the curves of genus four produced by our method;
this is used to help decide which genera should be used in practice for constructing
cryptographic systems and which elliptic curve systems are made weaker by our
methods. Finally in Section 7, we turn our attention to other types of nite elds
and discuss why the ideas of this paper are unlikely to work in other cases. In
particular, for a large proportion of elliptic curves dened over F
2
p
, where p is
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prime, we show that the methods of this paper give no decrease in security of the
resulting cryptosystem.
The rst author would like to thank R. Harley for many fruitful discussions
on the hyperelliptic discrete log; some tricks are due to him. The second author
would like to thank J. Cannon for his support while this work was in preparation.
The third author would like to thank G. Frey, S. Galbraith, E. Scheafer and S.
Vanstone, for various discussions whilst the work on this paper was carried out. All
three authors would like to thank S. Galbraith, N. Koblitz and K. Paterson and
an anonymous referee, who read and commented on earlier drafts of this paper.
The calculations in this paper were made possible by using a variety of packages
including Magma, KASH, LiDIA, PARI/GP and ZEN.
2. Example Curves in the Weil Restriction
Let k = F
q
denote some nite eld of characteristic two, and let n  2 denote an
integer. In practice we are thinking of the situation where n is quite small and q is
large enough so that q
n
> 2
160
. Let K denote the eld extension F
q
n
, with k-basis
f 
0
;  
1
; : : : ;  
n 1
g.
In this section we shall consider elliptic curves E over K, given by the equation:
Y
2
+XY = X
3
+ ;
where  2 K. Notice that for such curves condition (y) is satised. We assume
E(F
q
n
) contains a subgroup of prime order p with p  q
n
.
We set
 = b
0
 
0
+ b
1
 
1
+ : : :+ b
n 1
 
n 1
;
X = x
0
 
0
+ x
1
 
1
+ : : :+ x
n 1
 
n 1
;
Y = y
0
 
0
+ y
1
 
1
+ : : :+ y
n 1
 
n 1
;
where b
i
2 k are given and x
i
; y
i
2 k are variables. Substituting these equations
into the equation for our elliptic curve, and equating coecients of  
i
, we obtain
an abelian variety A dened over k, of dimension n, the group law on A being given
by the group law on E(K). The variety A is called the Weil restriction, and the
above process is called Weil descent.
Since A is isomorphic to E(K) as a group, the variety A will contain an irre-
ducible subvariety B (we do not exclude B = A) with group order divisible by p. In
curves of cryptographic interest, where p  q
n
, this subvariety will either equal the
whole of A or have dimension at least n 1, which can be seen by simple cardinality
arguments. The variety B is the part of A in which our discrete logarithm problem
is dened. We wish to nd a curve C in A whose Jacobian contains a subvariety
isogenous to B. Recall that B is the part of A which is interesting for cryptographic
applications. Hence, we must have g = dimJac(C)  dimB where dimB as stated
above will be either n or n  1. For the applications we would like the genus of C
to be linear in n, but it is highly unlikely such a curve exists at all.
For the rest of this section we shall look at a special set of nite elds for which
it is relatively easy to perform calculations. Our aim is to x the ideas and provide
a rich set of examples for the reader and for later in the paper. In the next section
we shall show that the remarkable properties we observe in this section hold in
general for elds of characteristic two. The method used is a natural extension of
the one presented in [9].
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We specialize to those elds K for which we can take  
i
= 
2
i
in our basis of K
over k where + 
2
+ 
4
+   + 
2
n 1
= 1. The reason for choosing such a basis is
so that the curves in the Weil restriction below have `small' degree and are easy to
write down. One reason for this is that squaring an element represented by such a
basis is simply a cyclic shift of the coecients since

2
n
=


2
n 1

2
=

1 +  + 
2
+   + 
2
n 2

2
= 1 + 
2
+ 
4
+   + 
2
n 1
= :
However, such a basis does not always exist, since we require the existence of an
irreducible factor of degree n of the polynomial h(x) = x
2
n 1
+   +x
4
+x
2
+x+1
over the eld k. Hence, we clearly require that the degree of k over F
2
must be
coprime to n, which we assume to be the case for the rest of this section. In addition,
for a root  of such an irreducible factor we require that the set f; 
2
; 
4
; : : : ; 
2
n 1
g
forms a basis of K over k.
Hence, for this section, we have restricted the choice of q and n. For n = 2, we
can always use the element dened by 
2
++1 = 0 whilst for n = 3 we can always
use the element dened by 
3
+ 
2
+ 1 = 0. For higher values of n we can obtain
many irreducible factors of h(x) of degree n over F
2
, and by the coprimality of the
degree of k to n we see that such factors will be irreducible over k. For example, if
n+ 1 is a prime and q is a generator of the multiplicative group of the eld F
n+1
then we can take  as a generator of K over k, where 
n
+ 
n 1
+   +  + 1 = 0.
To produce a curve of low genus in A one could produce a curve of low degree,
and hence of hopefully low genus. Such a curve of low degree can be obtained by
intersecting A with the hyperplanes given by x
0
= x
1
=    = x
n 1
= x. Hence,
we look at the subvariety dened by restricting X to lie in k. We obtain a curve C
dened by the equations
C :
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
y
2
n 1
+ xy
0
+ x
3
+ b
0
= 0;
y
2
0
+ xy
1
+ x
3
+ b
1
= 0;
.
.
.
y
2
n 2
+ xy
n 1
+ x
3
+ b
n 1
= 0:
That we can obtain such sparse equations is due to our choice of basis of K over k.
On elimination of variables we produce a curve in x and y = y
0
of the form
C : y
2
n
+ x
2
n
 1
y +
n 1
X
i=0
x
2
n
+2
i
+ g(x)
where g(x) is a polynomial, depending on b
0
; : : : ; b
n 1
, of degree less than or equal
to 2
n
. The polynomial g(x) is given by the formulae:
g(x) =
n
X
i=1
b
2
n i
i
x
2
n
 2
n i+1
;
where we make the identication b
n
= b
0
. The Jacobians of the irreducible compo-
nents of the curve C are isogenous to abelian varieties which contain subvarieties of
A, by the arguments of Section 2 of [9]. In examples of cryptographic interest the
subvariety B of A has order divisible by a large prime p, hence the degree of the
isogeny is likely to be coprime to p. Therefore, we can expect that the Jacobians
actually contain a subgroup isomorphic to the subgroup of B of order p.
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We give the following examples:
n = 2.
C
2
: y
4
+ x
3
y + x
6
+ x
5
+ b
0
x
2
+ b
2
1
= 0:
If the original elliptic curve is dened over the base eld, i.e. b
0
= b
1
, then the
curve C has two irreducible components, each being an elliptic curve. In all other
cases it is irreducible. Substituting a large number of elements for the parameters
b
0
and b
1
into the equation for C
2
, we found that experimentally the genus of this
curve always seems to be 2.
n = 3.
C
3
: y
8
+ x
7
y + x
12
+ x
10
+ x
9
+ b
0
x
6
+ b
2
2
x
4
+ b
4
1
= 0:
The curve is reducible when b
0
= b
1
= b
2
, in other words when the original elliptic
curve is dened over the base eld k. In all other cases it is irreducible, and
experimentally the genus of this curve always seems to be 3 or 4.
n = 4.
C
4
: y
16
+ x
15
y + x
24
+ x
20
+ x
18
+ x
17
+ b
0
x
14
+ b
2
3
x
12
+ b
4
2
x
8
+ b
8
1
= 0:
Experimentally, when the curve is irreducible, the genus of this curve always seems
to be at most 8. This curve is reducible when b
3
= b
0
+ b
1
+ b
2
, and when it is
reducible, one of the components is given by
C
4a
: y
8
+ x
4
y
4
+ x
6
y
2
+ x
7
y + x
12
+ x
9
+ b
0
x
6
+ (b
2
2
+ b
2
1
)x
4
+ b
4
1
= 0:
When C
4a
is irreducible it experimentally always has genus at most 4.
Note, in all the cases when the curve C was irreducible, it experimentally had
genus equal to 2
n 1
or 2
n 1
  1. In addition, we noticed that the irreducible
components were always hyperelliptic. In the next section we shall prove that these
remarkable properties hold in general for curves satisfying condition (y).
3. Hyperellipticity and Genus of Curves in the Weil Restriction
In this section we show that the observations of the previous section about
the genus, irreducibility and hyperellipticity of the curves C hold in general. In
addition, we shall show the existence of a computable mapping from E(F
q
n
) to the
divisor class group of a hyperelliptic curve. It is this mapping which translates the
hard elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem into a potentially easier hyperelliptic
discrete logarithm problem.
3.1. The curve in the Weil restriction. We shall now letK denote an arbitrary
degree n extension of a nite eld k of characteristic two of q elements. We shall
make no assumptions about the existence of special types of bases of K over k as
we did in the previous section. In this section, to keep track of which elds we are
considering, all xed elements of K will be denoted by Greek letters.
We take an elliptic curve
E : Y
2
+XY = X
3
+ X
2
+ ;
where ;  2 K,  6= 0. We do not assume condition (y) unless explicitly stated.
We can form the Weil restriction as in the previous section by substituting the
coordinate representations of X and Y and expanding with respect to any given
basis of K over k, but for simplicity we assume that the sum of the basis elements
6 P. GAUDRY, F. HESS, AND N.P. SMART
is one. We intersect the resulting abelian variety A with the hyperplanes which
mark out the subvariety of values of X which lie in k. The resulting subvariety of
A will be a curve dened over k, in n+1 dimensional space, which we shall denote
by C, as in the previous section.
We wish to study the curves C geometrically, so we consider C over the algebraic
closure of k. In fact, we shall only need to go to the extension K.
Lemma 2. By a linear change of variables y
i
7! w
i
, dened over K, we nd that
C is birationally equivalent to the curve D, dened over K, given by
D :
8
>
<
>
:
w
2
0
+ xw
0
+ x
3
+ 
0
x
2
+ 
0
= 0;
.
.
.
w
2
n 1
+ xw
n 1
+ x
3
+ 
n 1
x
2
+ 
n 1
= 0;
where we have 
j
= 
j
() and 
j
= 
j
(), with  the Frobenius automorphism of
K over k.
We can extend the Frobenius automorphism  to K[x;w
0
; : : : ; w
n 1
] via (x) =
x, (w
i
) = w
i+1
for 0  i < n  1 and (w
n 1
) = w
0
. We obtain (y
i
) = y
i
for all
0  i  n  1.
Proof. It is convenient to prove the Frobenius automorphism statement rst. That
 can be extended as stated is obvious. Next set T =
 

j
( 
i
)

0i;jn 1
2 K
nn
and notice that T is invertible since TT
t
=
 
Tr
K=k
( 
i
 
j
)

is invertible because
nite eld extensions are separable. The linear change of variables of the Lemma
is then (w
0
; : : : ; w
n 1
) = (y
0
; : : : ; y
n 1
)T .
Let t
i
denote the i-th column of T , for 0  i  n   1. The y
i
are expressed
as K-linear combinations of the w
i
via (y
0
; : : : ; y
n 1
) = (w
0
; : : : ; w
n 1
)T
 1
. We
apply  to (w
0
; : : : ; w
n 1
) = (y
0
; : : : ; y
n 1
)T and obtain
(w
1
; : : : ; w
n 1
; w
0
) = ((y
0
); : : : ; (y
n 1
))
 
t
1
; : : : ; t
n 1
; t
0

= (y
0
; : : : ; y
n 1
)
 
t
1
; : : : ; t
n 1
; t
0

:
The second equation holds because of the relation of the y
i
and w
i
. As the matrix
 
t
1
; : : : ; t
n 1
; t
0

is invertible we conclude (y
i
) = y
i
.
We are left to prove the birational equivalence of C and D. Let  
0
; : : : ;  
n 1
be
a basis of K over k with
P
 
i
= 1. The equations of C are obtained by expanding
Y =
X
y
i
 
i
;  =
X
a
i
 
i
 =
X
b
i
 
i
and X = x
inE, and equating the resulting coecients of the  
i
. We obtain f
i
2 k[x; y
0
; : : : ; y
n 1
]
such that
w
2
0
+ xw
0
+ x
3
+ 
0
x
2
+ 
0
=
n 1
X
i=0
f
i
(x; y
0
; : : : ; y
n 1
) 
i
; :
The corresponding equations for C are
C :
8
>
<
>
:
f
0
(x; y
0
; : : : ; y
n 1
) = 0;
.
.
.
f
n 1
(x; y
0
; : : : ; y
n 1
) = 0:
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We denote the left hand sides of D by g
i
2 K[x;w
0
; : : : ; w
n 1
]. Upon applying T
columnwise to the equations of C we then see
 
f
i
(x; y
0
; : : : ; y
n 1
)

0in 1
T =

X
i
f
i
(x; y
0
; : : : ; y
n 1
)
j
( 
i
)

0jn 1
=


j

X
i
f
i
(x; y
0
; : : : ; y
n 1
) 
i

0jn 1
=
 

j
 
w
2
0
+ xw
0
+ x
3
+ 
0
x
2
+ 
0

0jn 1
=
 
g
i
(x;w
0
; : : : ; w
n 1
)

0in 1
;
which shows that C is linearly transformed into D by T .
Let F
i
be the splitting eld of the i-th equation dening D over K(x).
Lemma 3. We can form the compositum F = F
0
  F
n 1
over K(x) without am-
biguity. Let m 2 Z such that [F : K(x)] = 2
m
. Viewed over K the curve D
has 2
n m
irreducible reduced components, each having function eld K-isomorphic
to F .
Proof. We can form F without ambiguity because the extensions F
i
=K(x) are all
quadratic, hence Galois over K(x). More specicially, in order to generate F over
K(x) we can choose a suitable subset of m equations of the equations dening the
curve D, such that adjoining w
l
i
, for 1  i  m, to K(x) gives F , with w
l
i
a root
of the left hand side of the i-th such equation. The remaining n m equations of
D will each have two solutions w
v
j
and w
v
j
+ x in F .
Consider the homomorphism
 : K[x;w
0
; : : : ; w
n 1
]! K[x; w
0
; : : : ; w
n 1
]  F:
The kernel I of this homomorphism is a prime ideal of dimension one since F
is a eld of transcendence degree one over K being generated by x; w
0
; : : : ; w
n 1
over K. This prime ideal contains the left hand sides of D by construction of F .
Therefore, I denes an irreducible reduced component of D having function eld
K-isomorphic to F .
The statement about the number of these components follows from the possible
choices of w
v
j
or w
v
j
+ x in the denition of the homomorphism. This can be seen
in detail as follows: Assume I were contained in the kernel J of a homomorphism
 as above which maps w
v
j
to w
v
j
+ x. There are f; g 2 K[x;w
0
; : : : ; w
m 1
] such
that (g);  (g) 6= 0 and w
v
j
= (f)=(g) =  (f)= (g). Then gw
v
j
+ f 2 I  J
and g(w
v
j
+ x) + f 2 J hence gx 2 J and x 2 J because  (g) 6= 0 and J is prime.
This is clearly a contradiction as x is not mapped to zero by  .
3.2. Artin-Schreier properties. If we multiply the equations dening D by x
 2
,
substitute s
i
= w
i
=x+
1=2
i
=x and z = 1=x, we see that another model for our curve
D is
F :
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
s
2
0
+ s
0
+ z
 1
+ 
0
+ 
1=2
0
z = 0;
.
.
.
s
2
n 1
+ s
n 1
+ z
 1
+ 
n 1
+ 
1=2
n 1
z = 0:
The advantage of this model is that we can apply Artin-Schreier theory as out-
lined in [2, pp. 22{24], [14, pp. 275{281] and [18, p. 115]. We will use the following
special version of [14, p. 279, Thm 3.3]:
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Theorem 4. Let p be a prime number, }(x) = x
p
 x be the Artin-Schreier opera-
tor, K be a eld of characteristic p and

K be a xed separable closure of K. For ev-
ery additive subgroup   K
+
with }(K)    K there is a eld L = K
 
}
 1
()

with K  L 

K obtained by adjoining all roots of all polynomials x
p
  x   d for
d 2  in

K to K. Given this, the map
 7! L = K
 
}
 1
()

denes a 1-1 correspondence between such additive subgroups  and Abelian exten-
sions L=K in

K of exponent p.
Before giving the result we state the following Lemma which will be used repeat-
edly in the sequel.
Lemma 5. Any sum of an even number of the 
j
is of the form v
2
+ v with a
suitable v 2 F
2
().
Proof. For f(t) =
P
i
d
i
t
i
2 F
2
[t] we dene f(t)" =
P
i
d
i
"
2
i
for all " 2 K, thereby
turning the additive group K
+
of K into an F
2
[t]-module. The required statement
is then reformulated as follows: For f(t) 2 F
2
[t] with f(1) = 0 there is a suitable
v 2 F
2
() such that f(t) = (t + 1)v. But this is now easily seen to be true.
Namely, f(t) is divisible by t+1 and v can thus be chosen to be f(t)=(t+1).
Lemma 6. For m as in Lemma 3 we have the equality
m = dim
F
2

Span
F
2
 
1; 
1=2
0

; : : : ;
 
1; 
1=2
n 1
	

:(1)
The eld K is the exact constant eld of F (i.e. K is algebraically closed in F ) and
F is the compositum of the rst m elds F
i
over K(z), i.e. F = F
0
  F
m 1
.
The Galois group of F=K(z) is isomorphic to (Z=2Z)
m
. The action of  2
Gal(F=K(z)) is given by (s
i
) = s
i
or (s
i
) = s
i
+ 1, where s
i
is a root of the left
hand side of the i-th equation of F in F , for 0  i  n  1.
Proof. Consider the operator }(x) = x
2
+x and the additive group (or F
2
-module)

0
= Span
F
2

z
 1
+ 
0
+ 
1=2
0
z; : : : ; z
 1
+ 
n 1
+ 
1=2
n 1
z
	
:
We further dene  = 
0
+ }
 
K(z)

. With this we have F = K(z)
 
}
 1
()

=
K(z)
 
}
 1
(
0
)

and
m = dim
F
2
 
=}
 
K(z)

= dim
F
2
 

0
=
0
\ }
 
K(z)

;
where the rst equality holds according to Theorem 4 and the second equality holds
according to the rst isomorphism theorem for groups.
We have 
0
\}
 
K(z)

= 
0
\}(K) because applying } to non-constant functions
in K(z) would necessarily involve quadratic terms in z which are not to be found
in 
0
. Let us abbreviate U = Span
F
2
 
1; 
1=2
0

; : : : ;
 
1; 
1=2
n 1
	
. Expanding the
elements in 
0
into vectors in K
2
by taking the coecients of z
 1
and z gives a
surjective linear map 
0
! U . Its kernel is 
0
\ K. But every element of the
kernel must be a sum of an even number of the 
j
because otherwise the z
 1
would
not cancel. From Lemma 5 we conclude that 
0
\ K = 
0
\ }(K), and using

0
\ }(K) = 
0
\ }
 
K(z)

, we obtain 
0
=
0
\}
 
K(z)


=
U . The formula for m
is thereby veried.
In order to prove that K is the exact constant eld of F we have to show that
 \ K  }(K) (remember F = K(z)
 
}
 1
()

). But again every u 2  \ K is
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congruent to a sum of an even number of the 
j
modulo }(K). Lemma 5 gives
u 2 }(K) and K is hence algebraically closed in F .
The statement about the compositum is seen as follows: The rst m terms in
the denition of 
0
constitute a basis of the F
2
-vector space 
0
. This is due to
the property that, if the i-th term is dependend of the previous j-th terms for
0  j  i  1, then the i+ 1; i + 2; : : : terms would be as well because they arise
by applying  to the i-th term. Hence F is obtained by adjoining roots of the rst
m left hand sides of F to K(z) from which the statement follows.
From Theorem 4 and [F : K(z)] = 2
m
we obtain Gal(F=K(z))

=
(Z=2Z)
m
.
The action of  2 Gal(F=K(z)) is as stated because  xes all z
 1
+
i
+ 
1=2
i
z by
denition and hence has to map roots of s
2
i
+s
i
+z
 1
+
i
+
1=2
i
z to themselves.
3.3. Hyperellipticity and genus. Adding the 0-th equation to the i-th equation
of F for i = 1; : : : ;m   1 and substituting t
i
for s
0
+ s
i
, 
i
for 
0
+ 
i
and 
i
for 
1=2
0
+ 
1=2
i
we obtain
t
2
i
+ t
i
+ 
i
z + 
i
= 0; i = 1; : : : ;m  1:(2)
These equations dene extensions L
i
of K(z) such that F = F
0
L with L =
L
1
  L
m 1
the compositum of the L
i
over K(z). The eld L is crucial to es-
tablishing the hyperellipticity, since it denes a rational subeld of index two, as
we shall now show.
Lemma 7. The eld L is an extension eld of degree 2
m 1
of K(z). It is a rational
function eld L = K(c) having a generator c such that z = 
 1
+
P
m 1
i=0

i
c
2
i
with

i
2 K and 
0
; 
m 1
6= 0.
Proof. The extension eld statement follows from 2 [L : K(z)] = [F : L][L : K(z)] =
[F : K(z)] = 2
m
.
We now apply inductively some further transformations to (2). We wish to
determine a change of variables so that we obtain equations of the form
t
2
i
+ t
i
+ 
i
t
i 1
+ 
i
= 0; i = 1; : : : ;m  1;(3)
where t
0
= z.
We take the rst equation of (2) (i = 1) to be the rst equation of (3). Now
suppose after already having performed some transformations (with t
i
, 
i
and 
i
substituted properly), for some j 2 [2; : : : ;m  1], we are given equations
t
2
i
+ t
i
+ 
i
t
i 1
+ 
i
= 0; i = 1; : : : ; j   1;
t
2
i
+ t
i
+ 
i
z + 
i
= 0; i = j; : : : ;m  1
dening the extension L=K(z) as well. All left hand sides of these equations must
be irreducible due to the choice of m and hence we must have 
i
6= 0 since K is
algebraically closed in F , by Lemma 6. Because of this, being true also for the next
intermediate 
i
, we can carry out the following transformations:
By substituting t
j
+ (
j
=
1
)
1=2
t
1
for t
j
and using the above equation with i = 1
we obtain
t
2
j
+ t
j
+
 


j

1

1=2
+

j

1
!
t
1
+

j

1

1
+ 
j
= 0;
wherein we write 
j
for the coecient of t
1
and 
j
for the constant term. Next, we
use the equation for i = 2 to eliminate t
1
in the same way as was done with z = t
0
,
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and we repeat this for t
2
; t
3
; :::; t
j 2
; we eventually arrive at
t
2
j
+ t
j
+ 
j
t
j 1
+ 
j
= 0;
as desired. By induction we go on until j = m.
Next, by expressing z = (t
2
1
+ t
1
+ 
1
)=
1
, t
1
= (t
2
2
+ t
2
+ 
2
)=
2
, and so on, we
obtain z = 
 1
+
P
m 1
i=0

i
c
2
i
with c = t
m 1
and suitable 
i
2 K. Since L=K(z) is
separable and [L : K(z)] = 2
m 1
, we nally see that 
0
; 
m 1
6= 0.
To estimate the genus of our function eld we shall use the following theorem,
which is a special case of [18, Proposition III.7.8, pp. 115]:
Theorem 8. Let L=K denote a rational algebraic function eld of characteristic
two. Suppose that u 2 L is an element which satises the following condition:
u 6= w
2
+ w for all w 2 L:
Let F = L(y) with y
2
+ y = u. For a place P of L we dene the integer m
P
by
m
P
=
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
m
if there is an element z 2 L such that
v
P
(u+ (z
2
+ z)) =  m < 0 and m 6 0 (mod p)
 1 if v
P
(u+ (z
2
+ z))  0 for some z 2 L:
If at least one place Q of L satises m
Q
> 0 then K is algebraically closed in F ,
and
g =
1
2
 
 2 +
X
P
(m
P
+ 1) degP
!
;
where g is the genus of F .
Lemma 9. F=K is a hyperelliptic function eld of genus 2
m 1
or genus 2
m 1
  1
over the exact constant eld K.
Proof. The constant eld statement is proved in Lemma 6. Recall, we have F = F
0
L
and [F : L] = 2. Hence, the hyperellipticity is clear, since L is rational by Lemma 7.
Next we prove the genus statement. In order to obtain F from L we need to
adjoin to L a root of the left hand side of the 0-th equation dening F. We take a
closer look at the constant term (in s
0
) of this equation u = 1=z+ 
0
+ 
1=2
0
z 2 L,
where we think of z as a polynomial in c of degree 2
m 1
as in Lemma 7.
Since this polynomial is separable, it factors in K[c] into irreducible polynomials
with all multiplicities equal to one. The valuations v
P
(u) of u at the places P above
z = 0 of the rational function eld L (i.e. those places satisfying v
P
(z) > 0) are
thus all  1 and we obtain m
P
= 1. We additionally know
P
v
P
(z)=0
degP = 2
m 1
,
this is easily seen as we are working in a rational function eld.
We now consider the degree valuation 1 of L = K(c). Since z = 
 1
+
P
m 1
i=0

i
c
2
i
there are ~u; v 2 K[c] such that 
1=2
0
z = ~u+v
2
+v and deg(~u)  1. The
polynomial v can be obtained e. g. by successively eliminating leading terms using
elements of the form (c)
2
i
+ (c)
2
i 1
. Thus v
1
(u+ v
2
+ v)   1 and m
1
= 1 or
m
1
=  1.
The remaining places P of L have v
P
(u) = 0 hence m
P
=  1. Summing up,
using Theorem 8, we nally obtain g = 2
m 1
or g = 2
m 1
  1.
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3.4. Restriction to smaller constant eld. Up to now we have used the Artin-
Schreier nature of the equations dening D (resp. F) in an essential way, in order
to obtain the statements on the hyperellipticity and the genus. Next, we need to
restrict to a smaller constant eld, and here we will use the existence of a Frobenius
automorphism on F which is due to the very construction of D.
Lemma 10. The Frobenius automorphism  of K over k extends (non uniquely)
to a k-automorphism on F of order n or 2n, again denoted by .
We have roots s
i
= 
i
(s
0
) of the left hand sides of F and accordingly roots
w
i
= 
i
( w
0
) of the left hand sides of D with w
i
= xs
i
+ 
1=2
i
for all 0  i  n  1.
Proof. The Frobenius automorphism  extends to a k-automorphism of K(x) =
K(z) by leaving x, resp. z, xed.
The eld F is obtained from K(z) by successively adjoining roots s
i
for 0  i 
m  1 of the left hand sides of F to K(z). Once these m roots s
i
are adjoined roots
s
i
of the other equations for m  i  n   1 are readily to be found in F and 
will be dened on them. For m = 1 we can simply dene (s
0
) = s
0
. Assume we
have m > 1 and  : K(z)(s
0
; : : : ; s
i 1
) ! F for an i with 0  i < m  1. We can
extend  to K(z)(s
0
; : : : ; s
i
) ! F by choosing (s
i
) = s
i+1
because the left hand
side of the i-th equation of F is irreducible over K(z)(s
0
; : : : ; s
i 1
) and applying 
to z
 1
+ 
i
+ 
i
z gives z
 1
+ 
i+1
+ 
i+1
z. Hence we can extend  to the whole
of F by dening  on s
i
for 0  i  m  1.
The order of any such  on F must be a multiple of n since K  F and  has
order n on K. Furthermore, 
n
(s
0
) = s
0
or 
n
(s
0
) = s
0
+ 1 because 
n
(s
0
) must
be a root of the left hand side of the rst equation of F. We conclude that the order
of  on F will be n or 2n accordingly.
The statement on the roots is clear and serves primarily as a denition for later
use.
It is at this point that condition (y) becomes important.
Lemma 11. If condition (y) is satised then the extension  in Lemma 10 of the
Frobenius to F can be chosen with order exactly n on F .
Proof. We now need to derive a precise condition for the order of such extensions
. It will turn out that we have to carefully choose a particular extension  if we
want to obtain order n. The precise condition will be obtained from the precise
value of 
n
(s
0
), and is then compared to condition (y).
To begin with we start with any extension  of the Frobenius to F which will be
changed later as required. It is convenient to employ the following technique: For
f(t

) =
P
i
d
i
t
i

2 F
2
[t

] we dene f(t

)s =
P
i
d
i

i
(s) where s 2 F arbitrarily,
thereby turning F
+
into an F
2
[t

]-module. As a subgroup K
+
inherits this F
2
[t

]-
module structure which is compatible with the F
2
[t]-module structure of K
+
used
in the proof of Lemma 5 under the relation t

= t
r
for r = log
2
(q).
We let f

0
(t

) be the polynomial of smallest degree such that f

0
(t

)
0
= 0 and
set
f(t

) =

f

0
(t

) for deg f

0
(t

) even;
(t

+ 1)f

0
(t

) otherwise.
The same polynomials f

0
and f are obtained upon replacing 
0
with 
1=2
0
. From
Lemma 6 and its proof it is easily seen that deg f(t

) = m.
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Since (t
n

+ 1)
0
= 0 there is an h(t

) 2 F
2
[t

] such that h(t

)f(t

) = t
n

+ 1.
We have
 
f(t

)s
0

2
+ f(t

)s
0
= f(t

)
 
s
2
0
+ s
0

= f(t

)
 
z
 1
+ 
0
+ 
1=2
0
z

= f(t

)
0
:
Now, as f(1) = 0, we can apply Lemma 5 to the last right hand side above and nd
a v 2 K with v
2
+v = f(t

)
0
. Here we actually have a choice between v and v+1
which will be important later. Adding v
2
+ v to the rst left hand side above we
obtain f(t

)s
0
+ v 2 f0; 1g. It is now that we have to choose the correct extension
of , depending on the choice of v: If we have f(t

)s
0
+ v = 1 we replace  by a

0
which satises 
0
(s
i
) = (s
i
) for 0  i < m   1 and 
0
(s
m 1
) = (s
m 1
) + 1,
which we can do according to the extension process at the beginning of the proof.
Since the leading term of f(t

) is t
m

and s
m 1
= 
m 1
(s
0
) we can hence assume
f(t

)s
0
+ v = 0:(4)
Multiplying this with h(t

) yields (t
n

+ 1)s
0
+ h(t

)v = 0 from which we draw the
conclusion:  has order n on F if and only if h(t

)v = 0. The rest of the proof
deals with the relation of this condition and (y), and the suitable choice of v.
Using the proof of Lemma 5 and the above compatibility remark we see that we
can choose between v = f(t
r
)=(t+1)
0
and v = f(t
r
)=(t+1)
0
+1. Multiplying the
rst v with h(t
r
) we obtain h(t
r
)f(t
r
)=(t+1)
0
= (t
rn
+1)=(t+1)
0
= Tr
K=F
2
(
0
).
Thus, depending on the choice of v,
h(t

)v =

Tr
K=F
2
(
0
) or
Tr
K=F
2
(
0
) + h(1):
(5)
Our k-automorphism  on F , depending on v, has order n if and only if we obtain
zero for at least for one of the cases in the right hand side of (5). But this is implied
by (y): The case Tr
K=F
2
(
0
) = 0 is clear. For n odd we obtain h(1) = 1 because
t

+ 1 divides t
n

+ 1 only once. For n = m we obtain h(t

) = 1 hence h(1) = 1
too.
We remark that the conditions (y) are sucient but not necessary for the exis-
tence of an extension of the Frobenius automorphism ofK=k to F of order n. Precise
conditions can be derived from (5) and may be summarized as follows: \ The ex-
tension exists either for all  2 K or only for those  2 K with Tr
K=F
2
() = 0,
given any xed  2 K

".
Theorem 12. Let  be an extension of the Frobenius automorphism of K=k to F ,
having order n, and let F
0
be the eld of elements of F xed by . The eld F
0
is a hyperelliptic function eld of genus 2
m 1
or 2
m 1
  1 over the exact constant
eld k. The curve C has an irreducible reduced component having F
0
as its function
eld.
Such a k-automorphism  exists if the condition (y) is satised.
Proof. We let L
0
= F
0
\ L. The relations between the elds F; F
0
; L and L
0
are
described by Figure 1.
The xed eld F
0
of  has index n in F because  is of order n on F and it is
clear that F
0
\K = k holds because  is of order n on K as well.
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k
n
1
@
@
@
@
@
K k(x)
2
m 1
1
n
@
@
@
@
K(x)
K(E)
@
@
@
@
 
 
 
 
2
L
2
m 1
L
0
@
@
@
@
2
n
F
2
F
0
@
@
@
@
n
Figure 1. Lattice Diagram of Fields
The automorphism  restricts to a k-automorphism of L of order n because it
is the unique subeld of F of index 2 and K  L. Thus, [L : L
0
] = n, since L
0
is
the xed eld of  restricted to L and we obtain [F
0
: L
0
] = 2, as desired. Clearly
F = F
0
K (and also L = L
0
K) which gives the genus statement.
From the w
i
we obtain n, not necessarily distinct, elements y
i
via the linear
transformation of Lemma 2. The automorphism  operates cyclically on the w
i
so
that we have (y
i
) = y
i
, as was proved generically in Lemma 2. The y
i
are thus in
F
0
and together with x they generate F
0
over k (because the w
i
can be obtained
from the y
i
over K). Due to Lemma 2 the y
i
satisfy the equations of C, from which
we nally see that C has an irreducible reduced component with function eld F
0
(we can for example again use the kernel technique from the proof of Lemma 3).
The existence of  under condition (y) was proved in Lemma 11.
Note, that if condition (y) is not satised and  has order 2n, then we could
have F
0
= L
0
in the arguments of the proof of Theorem 12, and hence we could not
guarantee nding a curve dened over k which is hyperelliptic and has genus 2
m 1
or 2
m 1
  1.
If the value of m is too small then none of the irreducible components of C will
have a Jacobian which contains a subvariety isogenous to the subvariety B of A.
For example, let E(F
q
n
) denote a Koblitz curve, i.e. one dened over the eld F
2
.
We will then obtain irreducible components of C of genus one, by the denition of
m. In this case, the Weil restriction A factors as the product
A = E(F
q
)B
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where B is an n  1-dimensional abelian variety dened over F
q
. The curve in the
Weil restriction we have constructed has irreducible components whose Jacobians
are isogenous to E(F
q
) and so we obtain no information about the subvariety B
from our curves. This does not mean that one cannot nd useful curves in A,
whose Jacobian contains a subvariety isogenous to B. It just means that the curves
we have constructed are not useful in this context. This is why we have assumed
throughout that E is not dened over a proper subeld of K.
In view of Theorem 12 and Lemma 11 we assume for the rest of Section 3 that
we are given an extension  of the Frobenius automorphismus of K=k on F of order
n and that  operates cyclically on the s
i
and w
i
while leaving x and z xed. This
can be reached when the condition (y) is fullled.
3.5. Determination of an explicit model for F and F
0
. We describe how to
obtain Artin-Schreier equations dening F over L and F
0
over L
0
. The correspond-
ing hyperelliptic equations are easily obtained by similar (reversed) transformations
as done in the beginning of 3.2.
To compute an Artin-Schreier equation in s
0
and c for F over L for the generators
s
0
2 K(E)  F and c 2 L, we only need to substitute
 

 1
+
P
m 1
i=0

i
c
2
i

 1
for z
in the rst equation s
2
0
+ s
0
+ z
 1
+ 
0
+ 
1=2
0
z = 0 of F, due to Lemma 7.
In order to determine the action of  on F we need to compute 
i
(c) and 
i
(s
0
)
for 0  i  n  1 as expressions in c and s
0
. This can be done using the operation
of  as given in (4) and by tracing back the transformations of Lemma 7. Note
that c is a K-linear combination of z and the 
i
(s
0
) for 0  i  m   1 and that
each of these can in return be expressed in c (z = f(c) resp. 
i
(s
0
) = f
i
(c) + s
0
for
suitable f; f
i
2 K[c]).
Given c and s
0
and the action of  on c and s
0
we can explicitly construct F
0
and L
0
as follows:
Lemma 13. Choose  2 K such that Tr
K=k
() = 1 and set ~c = Tr
L=L
0
(
0
c),
~s = Tr
F=F
0
(s
0
). We then have L
0
= k(~c) and F
0
= k(~s; ~c). An Artin-Schreier
equation dening the eld F
0
over L
0
is given by
~s
2
+ ~s+ 1=z +Tr
K=k
(
2
) + Tr
K=k
(
2

1=2
) z(6)
+
 
Tr
F=F
0
(
2
s
0
) + Tr
F=F
0
(s
0
)

= 0;
where the absolute coecient in ~s of the left hand side of this equation, the element
z and hence the last line Tr
F=F
0
(
2
s
0
) + Tr
F=F
0
(s
0
) are in L
0
.
Proof. From the extension structure L=K(z), because z = 
 1
+
P
m 1
i=0

i
c
2
i
and
(z) = z, it is clear that  maps poles of c to poles of c. Since L is rational we see
that there are ; 
0
2 K such that (c) = c+ 
0
. Then
(z) = 
 

 1
+
m 1
X
i=0

i
c
2
i
!
= (
 1
) +
m 1
X
i=0
(
i
)


02
i
+ 
2
i
c
2
i

:
On equating coecients in (z) = z, we obtain for i  0
(
i
)
2
i
= 
i
:
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For i = 0 we thus obtain
(
0
c) = (
0
)(c+ 
0
) = 
0
c+ (
0
)
0
:
Now from this ~c = Tr
L=L
0
(
0
c) = 
0
c+ 
00
for some 
00
2 K and thus L
0
= k(~c).
Consider the Galois group of F=K(z). According to Lemma 6 it is an elementary
abelian 2-group whose elements send each 
i
(s
0
) to 
i
(s
0
) or 
i
(s
0
) + 1. Now let
 be the hyperelliptic involution on F=L, being an element of this Galois group.
Since  xes L and any of the 
i
(s
0
) generates F over L we must have (
i
(s
0
)) =

i
(s
0
) + 1 = 
i
((s
0
)) for all i. We thus see that  and  commute in their action
on F and that hence  operates by restriction on F
0
=L
0
. We again consider the
equations dening F. Using Tr
K=k
() = 1 we obtain (~s) = ~s+ 1 and
Tr
F
0
=L
0
(~s) = ~s+ (~s) = 1:
Using
~s
2
= Tr
F=F
0
(
2
s
2
0
) = Tr
F=F
0
(
2
(s
0
+ 1=z + + 
1=2
z))
we obtain for the norm
N
F
0
=L
0
(~s) = ~s(~s+ 1)
= 1=z + Tr
K=k
(
2
) + Tr
K=k
(
2

1=2
) z
+
 
Tr
F=F
0
(
2
s
0
) + Tr
F=F
0
(s
0
)

:
Putting together we thus arrive at equation (6). This equation is separable in ~s,
and by construction it has coecients in L
0
. Looking at the equations dening F
gives that the valuation of s
i
at the zeros of z is only half the valuation of 1=z. The
term in the second line of (6) is a K-linear combination of the s
i
and, as element
of L
0
, has therefore no poles except at ~c =1. It is hence a polynomial in ~c and we
can conclude that the left hand side of (6) is indeed irreducible.
The elements ~s and ~c can be computed in F using . The absolute coecient
in equation (6) is rst computed in K(c) and lies in k(~c) after substituting c =
(~c+ 
00
)=
0
.
We let y = xs
0
+ 
1=2
and ~y = Tr
F=F
0
(y) so that ~y = x~s + Tr
K=k
(
1=2
). In
the case of odd n we can choose  = 1 and obtain the equation
~y
2
+ x~y + x
3
+Tr
K=k
()x
2
+Tr
K=k
() = 0;
for x the inverse of the separable polynomial 
 1
+
P
m 1
i=0

i
((~c+ 
00
)=
0
)
2
i
2 k[~c].
We remark that in this case the genus of F
0
=k is 2
m 1
  1 if Tr
K=k
() = 0.
3.6. Mapping the discrete logarithm problem. We next address the question
of mapping the discrete logarithm problem from E to F
0
, where we again use the
function eld setting. We let Cl
0
(K(E)) denote the group of divisor classes of
degree zero of the function eld K(E) of E, and similarly for Cl
0
(F ). The divisor
class of the divisor D is written [D].
The conorm Con
F=K(E)
and norm N
F=F
0
maps we dene as in [5, pp. 65] (cf. [18,
pp. 63 and 239]), on recalling that F is a function eld extension of both K(E)
and F
0
. Both conorm and norm are homomorphisms of divisor groups, are well
dened on divisor classes and map divisor classes of degree zero to divisor classes
of degree zero.
The point group E(K) of the elliptic curve E is isomorphic to the group of
divisor classes of degree zero of K(E) [16, p. 66, Prop. 3.4]. The mapping of
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the discrete logarithm problem in the point group E(K) of E is then achieved as
follows: First we translate the problem into Cl
0
(K(E)). From there we use the
conorm Con
F=K(E)
in order to map it to Cl
0
(F ), and from there, using the norm
N
F=F
0
, to Cl
0
(F
0
). On composition we thus obtain a group homomorphism
 : E(K)! Cl
0
(F
0
):
The important question now is whether the large cyclic factor of E(K) of order
p is preserved by this homomorphism.
Lemma 14. The kernel of Con
F=K(E)
: Cl
0
(K(E)) ! Cl
0
(F ) can only consist of
2-power torsion elements of Cl
0
(K(E)).
Proof. Let D be a degree zero divisor of K(E). We have according to [5, pp. 66,
line 21] that
N
F=K(E)
(Con
F=K(E)
(D)) = [F : K(E)]D:
Thus, if Con
F=K(E)
(D) is principal, then [F : K(E)]D is also principal. But [F :
K(E)] = 2
m 1
which means that [D] has 2-power order.
According to the lemma the large cyclic factor can only be mapped to zero under
 by the norm N
F=F
0
.
For very small values of m, such as those obtained for Koblitz curves, the kernel
of  will necessarily be divisible by the large prime p. But if m is larger than
log
2
(n), then the large prime factor of the order of E(K) will be preserved in many
instances. Hence, to solve our discrete logarithm problem
P
2
= [l]P
1
on E(K) we map degree zero divisor classes representing P
2
and P
1
over to Cl
0
(F
0
)
using the map . Set D
1
= (P
1
) and D
2
= (P
2
). If we do not obtain D
1
= D
2
=
0, which in practice is unlikely unless the elliptic curve is actually dened over a
subeld of K, we can attempt to solve the discrete logarithm problem
D
2
= [l]D
1
in Cl
0
(F
0
).
The computation of images under  is in principle feasible by general methods,
such as those used for computations with algebraic number elds and their exten-
sions. Nevertheless, we want to give some rough indications on a method for our
case. We assume that we can compute suciently well with nite elds and that
we can dene the function eld of an irreducible ane plane curve, that we can
compute the decomposition into places of the principal divisor of an element and
of eective divisors and that we can evaluate elements at places.
Let P
1
be a place of K(E) of degree one where x; y 2 K(E) take the values
x(P
1
); y(P
1
) 2 K respectively (we assume for simplicity that x(P
1
) 6= 0;1). The
place P
1
is clearly the unique common zero of x + x(P
1
) 2 K(E) and y + y(P
1
) 2
K(E). Then Con
F=K(E)
(P
1
) can be computed as the greatest common divisor of
the numerators of the principal divisors
 
x + x(P
1
)

and
 
y + y(P
1
)

taken in F .
It is a divisor of degree 2
m 1
according to [5, pp. 65, Lemma 1].
Let P be a place of F dividing Con
F=K(E)
(P
1
) for some place P
1
of K(E) of
degree one (we decompose Con
F=K(E)
(P
1
) to compute P ). The place L \ P can
be described as the numerator of
 
f(~c)

, where f is the minimal polynomial of
~c(P ) over K and the principal divisor is taken in L. This is possible as ~c has
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no pole at P because x(P ) = x(P
1
) 6= 0, which we have assumed above (~c and
~y are dened after Lemma 13 and given as elements of F and generators of F
0
).
The place P can similarly be given as follows: Let h be a bivariate polynomial
over K such that h(; ~c(P )) is the minimal polynomial of ~y(P ) over K(~c(P )). ~y
is dened at P because all of the 
i
(y) are as x(P ) 6= 1. We may represent
P as the the greatest common divisor of the numerators of
 
f(~c)

and
 
h(~y; ~c)

,
where the principal divisors are taken in F . This divisor consists of only P without
multiplicities because as x(P
1
) 6= 0 we have that L \ P is unramied in F , hence
there are at most two places in the numerator of
 
f(~c)

and each of them occurs
with multiplicity one. Furthermore, if the other place Q 6= P above L \ P exists
then h(; ~c) has degree one as the residue class degree of P over L \ P is one. We
also obtain ~y(Q) = ~y(P ) + x(P ) 6= ~y(P ) and h(~y(Q); ~c(Q)) 6= 0, hence Q does not
occur in the numerator of
 
h(~y; ~c)

(cf. [18, p. 76, Thm. III.3.7.] and its proof, h
is one of the '
i
and ' is the minimal polynomial of ~y over K(~c)). We are actually
interested in determining the underlying place P
0
= F
0
\ P of F
0
, so we need to
express the situation with coecients in k rather than K.
For this we simply compute minimal polynomials
~
f;
~
h as above, but over k in-
stead, and compute P
0
as the greatest common divisor of the numerators of
 
~
f(~c)

and
 
~
h(~y; ~c)

, where the principal divisors are now taken in F
0
. This divisor consists
of only P
0
without multiplicities because of the same reasons as above.
Finally, N
F=F
0
(P ) = f(P; P
0
)P
0
where f(P; P
0
) = n deg(P )= deg(P
0
) is the
residue class degree of P over P
0
. We will have that N
F=F
0
(Con
F=K(E)
(P
1
)) is
eective and that its degree equals n2
m 1
, for the later taking [5, pp. 66, Lemma 2]
and its proof into account.
A program for computing F
0
and  given E has been written in KASH and is
planned to be written for inclusion in the Magma computer algebra system.
4. Constructing Hyperelliptic Cryptosystems
Our method for constructing hyperelliptic cryptosystems is now immediate.
1. Fix a eld k = F
q
and an integer n such that K = F
q
n
.
2. Choose an E over K of order 2
l
p where p is a prime and l is a small integer.
This can be achieved by generating curves at random and computing their
group orders using the algorithm of Schoof [15].
3. Construct the Weil restriction and the curve C as we did in Section 3.
4. Find a model H of an irreducible component of C in hyperelliptic form.
5. Check that the divisor class group of H over k has a subgroup of order p.
The nal condition is necessary since we only know that a subvariety of A is isoge-
nous to a subvariety of the Jacobian of H . Clearly in step 2 we should only choose
curves for which condition (y) will automatically hold, i.e. n odd or Tr
K=F
2
() = 0.
If in the above algorithm we choose n = 4, b
3
= b
0
+ b
1
+ b
2
, with the special
examples of Section 2, we will expect to obtain a hyperelliptic curve of genus 3 or
4, dened over k, whose Jacobian will, in general, have order 2
l
p. If l is chosen
small then we do not expect to obtain genus 3. If we choose n = 2, and a very
small value for l, then we expect to obtain a hyperelliptic curve of genus 2, dened
over k, whose Jacobian has order divisible by p.
4.1. Genus Four Example. We consider an example where p  2
80
. Clearly this
is not large enough for cryptographic use, but we use it for illustrative purposes,
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both here and later. Curves with p > 2
160
are just as easy to produce, they just
require more paper to write down.
Consider the eld k = F
2
21
generated over F
2
by a root of the polynomial:
w
21
+ w
2
+ 1:
Let K = F
2
84
be generated over k by a root of the polynomial

4
+ 
3
+ 
2
+  + 1:
We construct the elliptic curve
E : Y
2
+XY = X
3
+ b
0
 + b
1

2
+ b
2

4
+ b
3

8
where
b
0
= 0; b
1
= w
1127280
; b
2
= w
171398
; b
3
= w
1370436
:
Notice that b
3
= b
0
+ b
1
+ b
2
, and so we expect to obtain a hyperelliptic curve of
genus four. The order of E(K) is computed using the algorithm of Schoof [15] and
it is equal to 2
4
p, where
p = 1208925819614311295169073:
Our algorithm for producing a curve of genus four in the Weil restriction produces
the curve C
4a
, of Section 2. This curve has Jacobian also of order 2
4
p. But the
curve C
4a
is birationally equivalent to the following hyperelliptic curve, which we
calculated using the method in Section 3,
H : Y
2
+G(X)Y + F (X) = 0(7)
where G(x) is given by
X
4
+ w
624429
X
3
+ w
1248858
X
2
+ w
1442662
X + w
386860
and F (X) is given by
X
9
+ w
1859582
X
6
+ w
293124
X
4
+ w
1783647
X
3
+ w
1541982
X
2
+ w
1370912
X + w
1888298
:
4.2. Genus Two Example. We construct an elliptic curve over the eld K =
F
2
162
with group order equal to
5846006549323611672814739995379292203636332479268
which is four times a prime, p. We do not give the details of this elliptic curve here
for reasons of space. The Weil restriction, and our construction of the associated
hyperelliptic curves, produces the following example of a genus two hyperelliptic
curve dened over k = F
2
81
.
Dene k by k = F
2
[w]=(1 + w
4
+ w
81
). The Jacobian of the hyperelliptic curve
of genus two given by
H : Y
2
+ (X
2
+ w
2012013793551629036365609
X)Y
= X
5
+X
4
+ w
1586464037343056940725724
X
2
+w
43334222987849600951547
X + w
774788345987798314632240
has order divisible by p. Its group structure is given by C
2
 C
2p
and it is not
subject to the Tate-pairing attack [8] since p does not divide q
k
 1 for small values
of k.
WEIL DESCENT ON ELLIPTIC CURVES 19
Notice, that if the original elliptic curve E(F
q
n
) resists the Tate pairing attack,
i.e. there does not exist a small value of k for which q
nk
  1  1 (mod p), then the
analogous test for the Jacobian is obviously satised for small values of k.
5. Attacking Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
The question remains as to whether the above construction provides either a
mechanism to attack elliptic curve cryptosystems or whether the hyperelliptic cryp-
tosystems proposed above are strong. In this section we discuss the diculty of
solving the discrete logarithm problem in the Picard group of the hyperelliptic
curves we have constructed. We shall assume a xed, small, value of n and we look
at the situation as q tends to innity.
For any group, the rho method (with Pohlig-Hellman) provides an algorithm
for computing the discrete logarithm in time O(
p
p) where p is the largest prime
factor of the order of the group. For general elliptic curves, this is the best known
algorithm. For the curves dened over F
q
n
considered in this paper we obtain a
complexity of O(q
n=2
) in general.
For hyperelliptic curves, we can obtain a better complexity by using an index-
calculus method. If the curve is dened over F
q
and the genus is not too high (say
at most 8), we can proceed as follows. We consider a factor base containing all the
prime divisors of the Jacobian of degree one. We can then proceed in two phases. In
the rst phase, relations are found between the elements of the factor base, whilst
in the second phase we perform sparse linear algebra to solve the original discrete
logarithm problem. The details of this algorithm are in [10], but we give some
details in an example below.
Theorem 15 (Gaudry [10]). There is an index calculus style algorithm to solve
the hyperelliptic discrete logarithm problem in a hyperelliptic curve of genus g over
the eld F
q
which requires a factor base of size O(q) and which runs in time
O
 
g
3
g!q log

q

+O
 
g
3
q
2
log

q

for some xed integer .
Hence, for xed values of g the complexity of this algorithm is O(q
2+
), which
is better than the rho method for a (almost) cyclic Jacobian of genus at least 5.
However, it is unclear where the exact crossover point between the method of [10]
and the rho method lies.
The theoretical complexity can be improved by reducing the size of the factor
base. The smoothness bound is already minimal, but we can decide that some
of the prime divisors of degree one are `good' (we keep them in the factor base),
whereas others are rejected. If we set the proportion of `good' divisors to 1=l, then
the time for nding a relation will be increased by a factor l
g
. However, we will
need l times less such relations, and the cost of the linear algebra will be reduced by
a factor 1=l
2
. If we try to optimize the choice of l, we obtain l = ((q=g!)
1=(g+1)
)
and the complexity becomes O(q
2g
g+1
+
), as q !1.
In the following table we give the complexities of the discrete logarithm problem
on the elliptic curves studied in the previous sections and on the corresponding
Jacobians. We only look at the genera which are likely to occur in practice for the
example curves in Section 2 and we ignore the q

term in the complexity estimate.
Notice that for the `interesting' subvariety of Jac(C) in our Weil-descent examples
the complexity of the rho method on Jac(C) is equal to the complexity of the
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rho method on E(F
q
n
). For a general Jacobian of genus g the rho method has
complexity O(q
g=2
).
Example Curve C
2
C
3
C
3
C
4
C
4
C
4a
n, g 2,2 3,3 3,4 4,8 4,7 4,4
rho on E(F
q
n
) q q
3=2
q
3=2
q
2
q
2
q
2
Index on Jac(C) q
4=3
q
3=2
q
8=5
q
16=9
q
7=4
q
8=5
We stress that these complexities hold as q tends to innity and with n and g xed.
Hence, for g  4 we obtain a complexity which is better than that of Pollard rho.
In a context where we would like to build a hyperelliptic cryptosystem by a Weil
descent, the Jacobians have to be almost cyclic, which occurs for the cases C
2
, C
3
and C
4a
. For the rst two, this seems to be a good way to build a cryptosystem
in genus two or three; however, for the last one the index-calculus provides an
attack with a better theoretical complexity than the rho method, and the security
is asymptotically lower than with an elliptic curve cryptosystem with the same key
size.
On the other hand, if we want to attack an elliptic curve cryptosystem, we
see that for C
4
and C
4a
the complexity of index-calculus is better than for the
rho method. Thus, asymptotically, it is a good way to attack such elliptic curve
cryptosystems by transferring the problem to a hyperelliptic curve.
However, experiments have to be done for each xed value of n and g to see where
is the crossover between the two attacks, since the group operations in E(F
q
n
) and
in Jac(C) will have dierent complexities. Such an experiment is carried out in the
next section.
6. Solving a Hyperelliptic DLOG Problem
It is important to decide, not only for the Weil descent attack but also for our
construction of hyperelliptic cryptosystems in genus four, whether the method of
[10] is practical in genus four. In this section we consider the example given by
the curve in equation (7). The elds size is q = 2
21
and the curve has genus 4,
so the Jacobian has size approximately 2
84
. We will solve a discrete logarithm
problem in this group using the method of [10] and then compare the running time
to known ecient implementations of the rho method in an elliptic curve group of
the same size. Since the rho method applied to a hyperelliptic curve will run slower
than on an equivalently sized elliptic curve, if the method of [10] runs faster on the
hyperelliptic curve compared to rho on an elliptic curve we will know that
 Genus four systems are less secure than the equivalent elliptic curve system,
for eld sizes greater than 2
21
. We would then conclude that genus four
hyperelliptic systems should not be deployed in real life.
 Elliptic curves dened over F
q
n
, with m = 3 and q = 2
t
, are weaker than
those dened over F
2
p
with p prime and of the order of nt.
We attempted to solve the discrete logarithm problem given by
D
2
= [l]D
1
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where
D
1
= (X
4
+ w
1277131
X
3
+ w
1087066
X
2
+ w
1391819
X + w
1964994
;
w
1784094
X
3
+ w
131164
X
2
+ w
1975559
X + w
2073352
);
D
2
= (X
4
+ w
895988
X
3
+ w
1765969
X
2
+ w
1667155
X + w
1531893
;
w
110642
X
3
+ w
2014036
X
2
+ w
927941
X + w
1063447
);
where the divisors are given in the reduced representation as in the paper by Cantor
[4]. In this notation, the point at innity is implicitly subtracted with the correct
multiplicity in order to obtain a divisor of degree zero. The above divisor D
1
is a
generator of the subgroup of prime order p  2
80
.
The factor base consists of all prime divisors of the form
p = (X + ; )
where ;  2 k = F
q
, and

2
+G() + F () = 0:
To each  there are two corresponding values of , but we only choose one of these
to be in our factor base, since the two prime divisors are related by the equation:
(X + ; ) + (X + ;G() + )  0;
in the divisor class group.
To reduce the factor base even further we only use divisors in the factor base
such that the binary representation of  has a bit representation with its three most
signicant bits set of zero. Where the bit representation is in the polynomial basis
with respect to w. Such prime divisors will be called `good'. In our example the
number of such good divisors which make up our factor base F is 131294.
Consider the following general reduced divisor
D = (a(X); b(X))
with deg b < deg a  g. A necessary condition for this divisor to factor over our
factor base of `good' divisors will be for the binary representation of a
deg a 1
, the
(deg a  1)th coecient of a(X), to have its three most signicant bits set to zero.
This gives us a simple test to eliminate lots of divisors which are not smooth over
our set of good divisors.
The algorithm proceeds as follows. We compute a set of `random' multipliers
M
i
= [r
i
]D
1
+ [s
i
]D
2
; for 1  i  20;
for some random integers r
i
and s
i
. Then setting R
1
= M
1
, say, we compute the
following random walk
R
i+1
= R
i
+M
h(R
i
)
where h : Jac(H) ! [1; : : : ; 20] is some hash function. Notice that every value R
i
can be written as
R
i
= [a
i
]D
1
+ [b
i
]D
2
:
We then try to `factor' R
i
over our factor base to obtain a relation of the form
R
i
=
X
p2F
[t
p
]p:
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Due to our choice of factor base this factorization can be achieved using root ex-
traction techniques over nite elds rather than general polynomial factoring tech-
niques. We eliminate many divisors, before we apply root extraction, by our test
for smoothness over the good divisors which we described above. The resulting t
p
lie in [ g; : : : ; g], where for our example g = 4. We store the t
p
in a matrix as
a column, which will have at most g non-zero entries in each column. Almost all
relations we obtain will have t
p
2 f 1; 0; 1g and will have exactly g non-zero values
of t
p
in each column.
After collecting more relations than elements in our factor base we can apply
sparse matrix techniques modulo p, such as the Lanczos method, to nd a non-
trivial element in the kernel of the matrix. Using the element in the kernel we can
then nd the solution to the original discrete logarithm problem, with overwhelming
probability, in the standard manner.
We ran the above algorithm on the above example. The relation collection phase
took about two weeks of calendar time, using the idle time of a disparate set of
machines. If we had ran this task on a single Pentium II 450 MHz, the timing
would have been about 31 weeks. The linear algebra step took 64:4 hours using the
same machine. After which we determined the solution to D
2
= [l]D
1
was given by
l = 12345678:
An equivalent calculation on an 84 bit elliptic curve, using Pollard's rho method,
would have taken 44 weeks on the same machine, with a program with a similar
level of optimizations applied. Since the crossover point is for a value of q less
than what would be used in practice, we can conclude that genus four hyperelliptic
systems are weaker than an elliptic curve system with the same size group order.
7. Other Types of Finite Fields
7.1. Non-composite Fields Of Even Characteristic. In Section 5 we looked
at what happens when n is xed and we let q tend to innity. In practice the
elliptic curves over even characteristic elds which are used are ones dened over
F
2
p
, with p a prime. Hence, we need to look at the situation where q is xed and
n tends to innity.
Let E denote an elliptic curve, dened over F
2
p
where p is prime. We expect
that the methods of this paper would produce a hyperelliptic curve of genus 2
p 1
over the eld F
2
. It seems unlikely that one would, in general, be able to nd a
curve of signicantly smaller genus in the Weil restriction of E(F
2
p
) over F
2
.
However, using equation (1) one may be able to nd, in very special circum-
stances, certain elliptic curves which have values of m slightly larger than log
2
p,
for which there exist curves in the Weil restriction of genus slightly larger than p,
as the following example shows:
Consider K = F
2
[w]=(1 + w + w
127
) and the elliptic curve dened by (a; ) =
(0; w), i.e.
E : Y
2
+XY = X
3
+ w:
The number points on E(K) is computed to be
#E(F
2
127
) = 2
20
 3
2
 45615671  395232781659164075412101:
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Along the arguments of Section 3 we computed its Weil restriction for n = 127
down to F
2
, obtaining the hyperelliptic curve
H : y
2
+ (x
128
+ x
64
+ x)y + x
128
+ x
64
+ x = 0:
The curve H has genus 127 and its Jacobian contains an element of order
#E(F
2
127
)=2:
We constructed this example by trying to makem as small as possible. It appears
that one can obtain very small values of m for  a zero of a polynomial with only
2-power coecients, in the above case 
128
+
2
+ = 0. Another similar value for
 may be obtained by a zero of the irreducible factor of degree 127 of x
2
10
+x
2
+x
over F
2
.
In general, for random , a small value of m is very unlikely as we shall now
show.
Lemma 16. We expect at least fty percent of all the elliptic curves over K = F
2
p
,
for p prime to produce a value of m equal to p.
Proof. By a change of variables we can put our curve in the form
Y
2
+XY = X
3
+ X
2
+ 
where  = 0 or 1 and  2 K. Now by the denition ofm in (1), if f; 
2
; : : : ; 
2
p 1
g
is a normal basis of K over F
2
then m = p. But around fty percent of all elements
of K generate a normal basis, as we shall now show.
By Lemma 3.69 and Theorem 3.73 of [12] the number of elements,  2 K, which
generate a normal basis over F
2
is equal to
2
p
t
Y
i=1
(1  2
 n
i
)
where n
i
denotes the degrees of the distinct monic irreducible factors of the poly-
nomial X
p
  1 over F
2
. But by Theorem 2.47 of the same book we see that this is
equal to

2
(p 1)=d
  1

d
= O(2
p 1
);
where d is the number of distinct factors of the polynomial X
p 1
+X
p 2
+    +
X + 1 over F
2
. Hence, around fty percent of all elements in K generate a normal
basis.
For general curves, where m = p and g = 2
p 1
, one needs to bear in mind that
although there is a sub-exponential algorithm for the discrete logarithm problem on
hyperelliptic curves of large genus, it is sub-exponential in the size of the Jacobian
which will be of the order of
2
g
= 2
2
p 1
:
But we are really aiming for a sub-exponential algorithm in the size of the original
elliptic curve, which is 2
p
. On the other hand, for the very special elliptic curve in
the above example, we indeed obtain a possible subexponential attack. Note that
the method of [10] should not be used in this case since it is only ecient for `small'
genera.
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To obtain a sub-exponential algorithm for very large genera the methods from
[1, 9, 11, 13] should be combined after suitable modication for our hyperelliptic
even characteristic case.
Hence, for curves dened over non-composite elds of characteristic two, we do
not expect the techniques in this paper to contribute a signicant threat to elliptic
curve cryptosystems. This last statement holds assuming curves are either chosen
with values of m of the order of p, or are chosen to be curves which are dened over
F
2
, i.e. a Koblitz curve.
7.2. Odd Characteristic Fields. The question arises as to whether the process
of Weil descent can be applied to elds of the form F
p
n
where p is an odd prime.
Clearly we must have n  2 and by similar arguments to those above n should not
be too large.
The proofs in Section 3 relied heavily on the Artin-Schreier nature of the ex-
tensions. It appears hard to see how they can be modied to apply in the odd
characteristic case. Indeed in the few examples we have calculated we see that the
resulting curves neither have such nice genera nor are they hyperelliptic in nature.
Hence, using odd characteristic elds does not seem helpful in constructing higher
genus hyperelliptic cryptosystems.
Let us turn to attacking elliptic curve systems based on elds of the form F
p
n
.
This is an open problem which we now outline with an example: Consider the eld
F
p
3
= F
p
[t]=(t
3
+ 3491750t
2
+ 217412320t+ 795426309)
where p = 1073741839 = 2
30
+ 15. An elliptic curve dened over F
p
3
is given by
Y
2
= X
3
+AX +B
where
A = 787621733t
2
+ 572191144t+ 6271705;
B = 167167209t
2
+ 739374709t+ 362095083:
For this curve it is easily veried that the group order is
#E(F
p
3
) = 2
4
 59  2261143  579962087855207501:
Setting
X = x
0
+ x
1
t+ x
2
t
2
and Y = y
0
+ y
1
t+ y
2
t
2
one can construct the Weil restriction.
Suppose the method of Gaudry could be extended to arbitrary Jacobians and
not just hyperelliptic Jacobians with almost prime group orders. This at rst sight
does not seem too implausible but is the subject of ongoing research [6]. One would
expect the resulting algorithm to have complexity at best O(p
2g
g+1
). Hence, to beat
the asymptotic complexity of Pollard's rho method on E(F
p
3
) we would require a
curve of genus at most 3.
Naively mimicking our method of Weil descent in characteristic two one forms
the curve C dened by the hyperplanes x
1
= x
2
= 0, i.e. specializing to those
x-coordinates which are xed under the Frobenius automorphism. The resulting
curve has genus 13 and is not hyperelliptic. Trying dierent types of bases for F
p
3
over F
p
and dierent hyperplanes does not appear to result in anything better.
This is an avenue for further work and the construction of a suitably well behaved
curve in the Weil restriction cannot be ruled out at present.
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8. Conclusion
Let E(F
q
n
) denote an elliptic curve over a eld of even characteristic, which is
not dened over a subeld of F
q
n
and which satises condition (y). Then we have
shown how the Weil restriction produces a hyperelliptic Jacobian of genus at most
2
n 1
which, for examples of cryptographic interest, contains a subgroup isomorphic
to a subgroup of E(F
q
n
).
Using this observation we can construct hyperelliptic cryptosystems by rst con-
structing elliptic curves using the Schoof algorithm and then determining the asso-
ciated hyperelliptic curve. This appears to be a way to produce secure hyperelliptic
cryptosystems in genus two and three. We recommend against using this method
in genus four and above because of our experiment in solving discrete logarithm
problems in genus four, where we showed that the discrete logarithm problem in
the Jacobian of a curve of genus four was easier than on an elliptic curve of the
same group order, with a security level of at least 80 bits.
However, for xed values of n  4, this provides evidence for the weakness of the
original elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. We have shown that for n = 4
and around 1=q of all such curves the crossover point, between our method and
Pollard rho, is at a value of q less than 2
21
. However, for larger xed values of n,
say n = 11 or 13, the crossover between our method and Pollard rho will be much
higher. Hence, further experiments are needed in determining the exact crossover
point between the two methods for various values of n.
We have no evidence to suggest that the discrete logarithm problem on general
elliptic curves, dened over elds of the form F
2
p
where p is prime, has complexity
smaller than O(2
p=2
). Since these are the elds of characteristic two which are
recommended in the elliptic curve standards, Weil descent does not appear to be a
threat to standards compliant elliptic curve systems in the real world.
However, we do recommend that elliptic curves dened over F
2
p
, for p prime,
should be checked to be sure that they produce a value for m in equation (1) which
is of order around p or equal to one, as in the case of curves dened over F
2
. Only
curves with these values for m should be deployed in real world cryptosystems. In
practice most elliptic curves over F
2
p
will satisfy such a requirement, but it is worth
adding this check to curve generation programs and to standards documents.
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